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Cooperation aims to increase the margin from which the incre-
ment of gain is to be drawn. It makes industry more produc-
tive; it gives the employer somewhat more, and to the laborer 
much more than they now receive. . . . All the workmen with 
their employers constitute collectively an exceptionally good 
entrepreneur. . . . The survival of full cooperation in the long 
rivalry of systems depends on its power to excel other sys-
tems. . . . If in the comparison with other systems, it is shown 
that it ought to survive, it will do so, and that regardless of ini-
tial failures.
—John Bates Clark, The Philosophy of Wealth, 1886
One-  hundred and twenty years ago John Bates Clark, one of the founders 
of the American Economic Association, developer of marginal productiv-
ity theory, and the person for whom the prestigious Bates Clark Award is 
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named, developed a vision of shared capitalism—the cooperative plan—
and laid out a key test for this form of capitalist enterprise, its ability to 
survive in competition with other forms. In his 1886 book The Philosophy of 
Wealth, Clark said that he wanted “to take the workman permanently out of 
the position in which his gain is his employer’s loss” through proﬁ  t sharing 
and stock ownership by the workers. His solution to workers’ risk aversion 
and lack of credit and personal funds to invest in capital was that the ﬁ  rm 
would pay proﬁ  t shares to workers in the form of stock, which would make 
proﬁ  t sharing a gradual vehicle for employee ownership.1 Clark underlined 
the need for skilled management and committed investors and stressed that 
access to new capital investment was critical to the success of such enter-
prises. He also noted the need for a cooperative management culture in these 
corporations. Clark did not envision worker-  elected managers nor worker-
  dominated boards of directors. Clark’s views suggest that forms of shared 
capitalism that combine proﬁ  t sharing and employee ownership without 
personal worker ﬁ  nancing in a cooperative corporate setting would posi-
tively aﬀect workplace performance and company success. Clark’s interest 
in shared capitalism was mirrored in the ﬁ  rst volume of the American Eco-
nomic Review, which contained extensive articles on cooperative economic 
relations in New England and Minneapolis in issues 4 and 5.2
This chapter analyzes the relationship of various forms of shared capital-
ist compensation to six workplace outcomes—turnover, absenteeism, per-
Chicago provided valuable assistance with the US General Social Survey segment that forms 
the basis for some of the analysis. Refen Koh, Rhokeun Park, Michelle Pinheiro, and Patricia 
Berhau provided excellent assistance in survey scanning, entry, and veriﬁ  cation.
1. Adam Smith (1776) credited the incentive of shared capitalism with improved economic 
performance for the French Metayers or sharecroppers, where the owner of the land and the 
sharecropper divided the produce equally after capital investments: “Such tenants, being free-
men, are capable of acquiring property, and having a certain proportion of the produce of the 
land, they have a plain interest that the whole produce should be as great as possible, in order 
that their own proportion may be so” (quoted in Laﬀont and Martimort [2002, 10]). He stressed 
that sharecroppers would not risk their own capital to improve the proprietor’s land without 
oﬀering any resolution to this problem.
2. Issue 4 included a 100- page article “Cooperation in a Western City” by Albert Shaw (1886) 
about such enterprises in Minneapolis, which examined proﬁ  t sharing by Charles Pillsbury in 
his mills and included an interview with Pillsbury. Issue 5 had a 129- page article “Cooperation 
in the Northeast” by Edward Bemis (1886) on Massachusetts companies. In the 1880s a group 
of doctoral students was assembled at Johns Hopkins University who divided up the United 
States into regions and studied forms of proﬁ  t sharing and employee ownership in these regions. 
The university published these studies as a book (Adams 1888). John Bates Clark worked 
closely with this group of researchers, several of whose articles appeared in the new journal of 
the American Economic Association. Clark’s views were similar to those of another prominent 
nineteenth-  century economist, John Stuart Mill, who said “The form of association which if 
mankind continues to improve must be expected in the end to predominate is not that which 
can exist between a capitalist as chief and workpeople without a voice in the management but 
the association of the labourers themselves on terms of equality, collectively owning the capital 
with which they carry on their operations, and working under managers elected and removable 
by themselves” (John Stuart Mill, Principles of Political Economy, Books III- V and Appendices 
[1848], in J. M. Robson, ed., Collective Works of John Stuart Mill, Vol. 3. Toronto: University 
of Toronto Press, 1965, 775).Creating a Bigger Pie?    1 4 1
ceived eﬀort of co-  workers, loyalty to the ﬁ  rm, willingness to work hard, 
and frequency of worker suggestions to improve productivity—from the 
perspective of the “John Bates Clark vision” of shared capitalism. We also 
examine employee responses to questions about their response to shared 
capitalist incentives. Our analysis uses the General Social Survey (GSS) and 
NBER data sets (described in the “Studying Shared Capitalism” section of 
the introduction to this volume).
4.1      The Clark Vision in Modern Eyes
Modern theorists concerned with shared capitalism highlight the poten-
tial of corporate culture in helping unify ownership and control with mini-
mal agency costs and enabling shared capitalism to fulﬁ  ll its potential. In 
his address to the Industrial Relations Research Association, Joseph Stiglitz 
deﬁ  ned the goal of shared capitalism as “to increase each worker’s involve-
ment in and identiﬁ  cation with the ﬁ  rm so that there will be some uniﬁ  ca-
tion of agent and principal and a resulting tendency for higher eﬀort . . . 
(in the belief that) a system of high involvement, high rewards, and high 
levels of skill and information, integrated with a corporate strategy that 
relies on front-  line employees’ ideas and creativity, is capable of impressive 
improvements in organizational performance” (2002). Analogously, in their 
book on incentives, Laﬀont and Martimort focus on “how the owners of 
ﬁ  rms succeed in aligning the objectives of various members, such as work-
ers, supervisors, and managers, with proﬁ  t maximization” (2002, 2). They 
emphasize that the decentralized nature of information and the cluster of 
transactions between the principal and the agent require an interaction of 
cultural norms and incentives to obtain the best economic institutions. Pre-
saging our analyses of the importance of worker co-  monitoring in shared 
capitalism (chapter 2), they stress that the multitude of tasks performed by 
the worker means that “a worker is not only involved in productive tasks 
but also must sometimes monitor his peers.” In both cases, as well as in the 
analyses of others,3 the implication is that shared capitalist compensation 
needs an appropriate corporate culture to reduce free rider and moral haz-
ard problems and that low intensity incentives that substitute for wages and 
increase worker risk would have problematic eﬀects on performance. These 
questions engage the issue of how much managers should own of the ﬁ  rms 
in which they work. For example, Morck, Shleifer, and Vishny (1988) show 
that simply more managerial ownership is not always optimal.
The other issue that theorists have identiﬁ  ed as critical to the working of 
3. Barnard (1938) deﬁ  ned incentives as involving a package of monetary and nonmonetary 
items saying material incentives were too weak unless enforced by other incentives. Even the 
bête noir of employee empowerment, Frederick Taylor, argued for paying fair wages along with 
generous performance- based pay and careful training to keep workers committed to maximum 
eﬀort, although consultants selling Taylorism dropped this component (Kanigel 1997).142    J.  R.  Blasi, R. B. Freeman, C. Mackin, and D. L. Kruse
shared capitalism is the allocation of the risk of ownership and the problem 
of credit barriers keeping workers from becoming real capitalists. Echoing 
back to Adam Smith, Stiglitz (1974) argued that the key issue in the use 
of sharecropping, as opposed to having employees renting capital, is the 
balance between its incentive eﬀects and risk-  sharing features. Though the 
rental system “has greater incentive eﬀects, it forces the worker to bear all 
the risks, and although the wage system allows the landlord, if he is risk 
neutral, to absorb all the risk, it may force heavy supervision costs on him.” 
He asserted that the end of sharecropping was best explained by the develop-
ment of capital markets that allow diversiﬁ  cation of risk, capital intensity in 
production, and a faster rate of technological change. These analyses high-
light the other distinct aspect of the John Bates Clark solution to the prob-
lem: share ownership arising from proﬁ  t sharing as a way to allow workers 
to obtain ownership without taking on risk beyond their means. Akerlof’s 
concept of a gift exchange carries this line of thinking a step further, with 
the exchange of ownership or proﬁ  t-  sharing above ﬁ  xed pay for recipro-
cating eﬀort serving as the risk-  reducing mechanism for shared capitalism. 
Asking workers for an excessively risky personal investment in the ﬁ  rm may 
defeat the idea and dynamics of a gift exchange. In the United States today, 
Employee Stock Ownership Plans (ESOPs), stock options, and company 
stock matches for contributions to retirement savings plans oﬀer workers 
ways to get equity in their company without buying it with their savings 
(though there is a small number of cases in which employees use 401(k) assets 
to create ESOPs or where work rule or wage or beneﬁ  t concessions are traded 
for stock as in the 2008 Chrysler restructuring) (see Smiley et al. 2007).
Existing research on shared capitalism has generally found better work-
place performance for ﬁ  rms with proﬁ  t sharing and employee ownership.4 
However, many of these studies were based on large administrative data 
sets and shed little light on the mechanisms through which shared capital-
ism functioned “inside the black box.” Here we use new data to go inside 
the black box.
4. Evidence from over 100 studies indicates a positive association on average between shared 
capitalism programs and company performance, but with substantial dispersion in results. For 
reviews of the employee ownership literature see Doucouliagos (1995); Kruse and Blasi (1997); 
Kruse (2002); Kaarsemaker (2006a, 2006b); and Freeman (2007). For subsequent studies see 
Kramer (2008) and Kim and Ouimet (2008). For detailed looks inside ESOP companies see 
Logue and Yates (1999) and Logue and Greider (2002). For a review of the broad-  based stock 
option literature see Blasi, Kruse, and Bernstein (2003). For reviews of the proﬁ  t-  sharing and 
gain-  sharing literatures see Weitzman and Kruse (1990); Bullock and Tubbs (1990); Kruse 
(1993); OECD (1995); Doucialiagos (1995); Welbourne and Mejia (1995); and subsequent 
studies by Zhuang and Xu (1996); Hansen (1997); Ohkusa and Ohtake (1997); Jones, Kato, 
and Pliskin (1997); Jones, Klinedinst, and Rock (1998); Collins (1998); McNabb and Whitﬁ  eld 
(1998); Arthur and Jelf (1999); Black and Lynch (2000); Knez and Simester (2001); Boning, 
Ichniowski, and Shaw (2001); Kim (2005); Robinson and Wilson (2006); Peterson and Luthans 
(2006); and Hassan, Hagen, and Daigs (2006). The average estimated increase in productivity 
associated with employee ownership and proﬁ  t sharing is about 4.5 percent, and is maintained 
when using pre/  post comparisons and attempts to control for selection bias.Creating a Bigger Pie?    1 4 3
4.2      Measures of Shared Capitalism
Were Clark to return to the United States today, the ﬁ  rst question he 
would ask about shared capitalism is the extent to which enterprises based 
on ﬁ  nancial sharing and decision-  making are found in the market—their 
“survival . . . in comparison with other systems.” The GSS provides the 
best evidence for answering this question. The overall prevalence of shared 
capitalist compensation was presented in tables 1.1 and 1.3 of chapter 1. 
For our purposes here the most important result is that 45 percent of the 
for- proﬁ  t private sector employees in the GSS sample report participating 
in some kind of shared capitalism program (36 percent in proﬁ  t sharing, 25 
percent in gain sharing, 19 percent in employee ownership, and 11 percent 
in stock options), which gives us good variation for examining the relation 
of these programs to worker outcomes. The prevalence is of course higher 
in the NBER sample, since these ﬁ  rms were selected on the basis of having 
these programs. There is no question that a layer of shared capitalism exists 
in the US economy. (See also table 4a.1 in the appendix of this chapter.)
As a ﬁ  rst step in assessing the relation of shared capitalism to employee 
outcomes, we constructed a thermometer-  style index of shared capitalism, 
which assigns points based on coverage by shared capitalism programs and 
the size of the ﬁ  nancial stakes. This index helps us assess whether a thick 
layer of shared capitalism as envisioned by Clark makes any diﬀerence. This 
index is described in appendix B. We also present results breaking out the 
diﬀerent forms of shared capitalism types and intensities using the more 
detailed NBER data.
4.3    Workplace  Outcomes
We measure six workplace outcomes: (a) turnover (looking for another 
job versus staying with the company); (b) absenteeism; (c) workers’ per-
ception of the discretionary eﬀort of co-  workers; (d) worker loyalty to the 
ﬁ  rm; (e) workers’ willingness to work hard for the ﬁ  rm; (f) the frequency 
of suggestions to improve eﬃciency. These outcomes are related to each 
other—for example, looking for another job predicts increased absenteeism, 
as does reduced willingness to provide discretionary eﬀort to the company, 
and lower loyalty. Reduced willingness to provide discretionary eﬀort to 
the company and lower loyalty relate to looking harder for another job. 
Increased absenteeism, looking hard for another job, and lower loyalty are 
linked to less discretionary eﬀort. Because there are large literatures study-
ing most of these outcomes separately, we decided against forming an index 
of these variables and instead look at each by itself. The summary statis-
tics in appendix A show variation in the measures among respondents in 
our surveys in the form of large standard deviations. The absenteeism vari-
able is the only one with a “peculiar” distribution since many people report 144    J.  R.  Blasi, R. B. Freeman, C. Mackin, and D. L. Kruse
zero absences while there is a long tail of persons absent for diﬀerent time   
periods.
We use basic multivariate statistics to assess the link between shared capi-
talist compensation and the outcomes. We estimate ordinary least squares 
(OLS) models of the impact of shared capitalist compensation on the work-
place outcomes where appropriate, and ordered probit models when the 
outcomes have several values with a natural ordering (e.g., “not at all true, 
not very true, somewhat true, and very true”). Because more than half of 
the values of absenteeism are zero, we use the tobit model to analyze that 
outcome. We run the regressions with the same independent variables for 
the national and NBER data sets and then probe our results in the NBER 
data set by adding measures of other human resource policies that may 
independently aﬀect the workplace outcomes, such as participation in an 
employee involvement team, training, and job security.
We interpret the results from the two surveys diﬀerently in light of the 
diﬀerence in their sample designs. Since the GSS is a nationally representa-
tive survey, it will have few if any workers in the same ﬁ  rm, so that it pro-
vides information on workers across ﬁ  rms. The variation in shared capitalist 
incentives and behavior reﬂ  ects diﬀerences in ﬁ  rm policies. By contrast, the 
NBER survey covers a representative sample of workers in a nonrepresenta-
tive sample of ﬁ  rms. To deal with the nonrepresentative ﬁ  rm problem, we 
include company ﬁ  xed eﬀects in most calculations. This focuses on the eﬀect 
of variation in shared capitalist incentives on attitudes and behavior within 
companies. However, we analyze some ESOP variables across companies 
as well as within companies because Employee Retirement Income Secu-
rity Act (ERISA) rules require virtually all workers in a ﬁ  rm to be covered, 
so that the cross-  ﬁ  rm variation in the data is potentially more informative 
than within-  ﬁ  rm variation, which may reﬂ  ect peculiarities between groups 
of workers within the ﬁ  rm.
Table 4.1 summarizes the empirical results of regression analyses of the 
relationship between the shared capitalism index and outcomes in our data 
sets. It shows that in both the NBER and GSS surveys, the likelihood of 
searching for another job is lower the higher is the shared capitalism index. 
When the controls in the national survey and in the NBER survey are the 
same, the coeﬃcient on the index is the same. Addition of measures of other 
human resource policies reduces the coeﬃcient in the shared capitalism vari-
able in the NBER data, but it still remains signiﬁ  cant (line 2b). In addition, 
the NBER asked workers if they would turn down a higher-  paying job to 
stay with their ﬁ  rm. The shared capitalist index raises the likelihood that 
workers would do so (line 3), which implies that they value these policies 
either for the additional income they are likely to bring or for the stake they 
give workers in the company.
The NBER survey asked workers how many days they were absent in the 
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the estimate in line 4 of table 4.1 shows that the shared capitalism index 
alone—without looking at the impact of the ﬁ  rm’s corporate culture—
raises absences. This is the only outcome variable that is adversely associated 
with the index. Why? Reviewing absenteeism and turnover research, Johns 
(2002) emphasizes that persistent absenteeism signals a break in the psycho-
logical contract of trust and deeper problems in the corporate culture. This 
perspective sees absenteeism as part of a withdrawal continuum involving 
lateness- absenteeism- lack of loyalty- intended turnover- ultimate withdrawal 
of membership in the ﬁ  rm. Thus, the ﬁ  nding that shared capitalism has a 
diﬀerent eﬀect on absenteeism than on prospective turnover, loyalty, and 
other factors runs against the basic analysis of absenteeism. Studies of the 
relation between unionism, which also reduces turnover, however, often also 
ﬁ  nd a positive association with absences. It may be that a greater sense of job 
security underlies both results. Another possibility is that absenteeism is a 
form of free riding that avoids co- worker scrutiny and criticism. Yet another 
possibility, which we explore later, is that the result is related to interactions 
with other ﬁ  rm policies and corporate culture.
Both the GSS and the NBER surveys ask workers how hard they believe 
their co-  workers work. The estimates show that perceptions of co-  worker 
eﬀort are signiﬁ  cantly positively related to the shared capitalism index, 
though the NBER result is no longer signiﬁ  cant after controlling for sev-
eral human resource policies (lines 5, 7). The NBER survey has two other 
measures that reﬂ  ect perceptions of the extent to which co- workers are com-
mitted to the ﬁ  rm: the extent to which co-  workers have enough interest in 
company issues to get involved in the ﬁ  rm, and whether co- workers generally 
encourage each other to make extra eﬀorts. Again, the results show that 
shared capitalist programs raise the likelihood that workers report positively 
on these outcomes, both before and after controlling for human resource 
policies (lines 8–  9).
Interpretation of the positive coeﬃcients of a worker’s receipt of shared 
capitalist compensation in predicting their perceptions of the work atti-
tudes of co-  workers is not, however, simple in the presence of the company 
dummy variables. The regressions reﬂ  ect how workers paid with shared capi-
talist compensation view their fellow workers (with a glow) rather than how 
shared capitalism aﬀects the workplace. Since we have many establishments 
or facilities within ﬁ  rms, they could also be telling us that facilities with 
greater shared capitalist compensation have workers who are willing to do 
more for the ﬁ  rm. One way to deal with this issue is to eliminate the com-
pany dummies from the regressions. This strengthens the estimated eﬀects. 
Another way to deal with the problem is to aggregate the data by facilities 
so that we relate the average shared capitalism index at a workplace to the 
average perception of co-  worker eﬀort within that worksite. This asks the 
question most relevant to our analysis: whether respondents perceive greater 
eﬀort in worksites with more shared capitalism, rather than whether workers 148    J.  R.  Blasi, R. B. Freeman, C. Mackin, and D. L. Kruse
with greater personal shared capitalist compensation perceive greater eﬀort 
in their fellow workers. Figures 4.1 to 4.3 display the scatter plot of observa-
tions for the site averages and the regression line for them. They show that 
the shared capitalist index at a worksite is positively associated with workers 
saying that co-  workers give greater eﬀort to the ﬁ  rm.
Fig. 4.2    Shared capitalism and co-  worker interest in company
Note: Co-  workers work interest in ﬁ  rm (1–  10 scale)   3.580 (.082)   0.173 (.028) (shared 
capitalist index).
Fig. 4.1    Shared capitalism and worker eﬀort
Note: Co-  workers eﬀort (1–  10 scale)   6.765 (.125)   0.087 (.043) (shared capitalist index).Creating a Bigger Pie?    1 4 9
Finally, we turn from perceptions of how co- workers behave to questions 
in which workers report on their own attitudes and behavior and relate these 
responses to the workers’ own shared capitalist compensation. Both surveys 
asked questions relating to worker loyalty. The GSS asked if workers were 
proud to be working for their employer: shared capitalism raises positive 
responses on this item (line 6). The NBER asked about loyalty to the ﬁ  rm: 
this measure is positively related to the shared capitalism index before and 
after controlling for high- performance policies in the NBER survey (line 10). 
The NBER survey also asked how willing workers would be to work harder 
to help the company, and the frequency with which they make suggestions 
about improving the workplace. The higher the shared capitalist index the 
more likely are workers to say that they themselves would work hard for the 
ﬁ  rm (line 11), and the more likely are workers to say that they make many 
suggestions (line 12).
4.4    Particular  Programs
The NBER survey contains suﬃciently detailed information and a large 
enough sample to allow us to disaggregate the shared capitalist index into its 
component parts to see which policies or programs contribute more/  less to 
the estimated eﬀects in table 4.1. Table 4.2 gives the results of these calcula-
tions for variables in which the individual reports on their own behavior or 
attitudes. Column (1) shows that the likelihood of not searching for a new 
Fig. 4.3    Shared capitalism and worker encouragement
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job is strongly related to proﬁ  t- sharing and gain- sharing eligibility, employee 
ownership, and having a larger stock option grant last year, and that workers 
who receive individual bonuses are also less likely to look for another job.
Column (2) shows that the aberrant ﬁ  nding that shared capitalism in-
creases absenteeism is higher among those who are eligible for proﬁ  t shar-
ing and who hold stock options. This goes against the ﬁ  ndings of lower 
absenteeism in proﬁ  t-  sharing companies in UK and French ﬁ  rms (Wilson 
and Peel 1991; Brown, Fakhfakh, and Sessions 1999) and with a study of 
US ﬁ  rms that found employee ownership alone did not aﬀect absenteeism 
(Hammer, Landau, and Stern 1981), though it is consistent with the ﬁ  nding 
by Brown, Fakhfakh, and Sessions (1999) that absenteeism increased slightly 
when proﬁ  t sharing was introduced after employee ownership. The regres-
sion ﬁ  nding that absenteeism is lower among those who are eligible for indi-
vidual bonuses lends some support to the possibility that higher absenteeism 
among those paid by group incentives reﬂ  ects free rider behavior.
The next two columns show that loyalty and willingness to work hard are 
positively related to the size of the proﬁ  t- sharing and gain- sharing bonuses, 
and to holding employer stock purchased through a 401(k) plan or on the 
open market (columns [3] and [4]). Loyalty is also positively linked to receiv-
ing a stock option grant last year, while willingness to work hard is linked 
to the size of one’s ESOP stake. The frequency with which workers report 
making suggestions is, by contrast, signiﬁ  cantly related only to employee 
ownership (column [5]).
Overall, the forms of shared capitalism that appear to have the strongest 
eﬀects on outcomes are proﬁ  t sharing and employee ownership.
The bottom panels in table 4.2 disaggregate the ownership variable and 
report coeﬃcients when the company dummy is removed from the regres-
sion. The results for the disaggregation of the ownership variable show 
that the largest ownership impacts come with 401(k) plans and when work-
ers buy shares on the open market. The sizable 401(k) eﬀect compared to 
the ESOP ownership eﬀect may reﬂ  ect the greater individual ownership of 
the 401(k) (although the company stock match for which workers do not 
pay with their savings in 401(k) plans is comparable to an ESOP) while the 
impact of buying shares on the open market may reﬂ  ect individual’s positive 
assessment of the future of the ﬁ  rm. Finally, the regressions that exclude 
company dummies to pick up diﬀerences in shared capitalist compensation 
across companies as well as across facilities and individuals within facilities 
ﬁ  nd stronger ESOP eﬀects than the regressions that include the company 
dummy variables.
4.5    Complementarities  → Corporate Culture?
A critical issue in analyzing a distinct organizational or institutional form 
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of other practices or policies or whether its impact depends interactively 
on them. The thrust of theoretical analysis of shared capitalist compensa-
tion, from Clark to the present, is that changing the monetary incentives 
by itself is unlikely to occur or work well independent of other policies. 
Firms that introduce proﬁ  t sharing or employee ownership must give work-
ers the authority to make decisions that increase performance to change 
their behavior in ways that raise output and proﬁ  ts.5 Research on “high 
performance work systems” have found that they work best as a package of 
complementary policies regarding recruitment, training/  information, per-
formance management/ sharing, work redesign, and so on.6 Recent evidence 
from the United Kingdom strongly suggests that the eﬀects of shared capi-
talism are conditioned by complementarities with other policies (Robinson 
and Wilson 2006). Based on these considerations and evidence we expect 
that shared capitalist incentives should also work better when combined 
with certain other ﬁ  rm policies.
To examine the interaction or complementarity of shared capitalist com-
pensation with high-  performance workplace policies, we constructed an 
index of high- performance work policies that gives one point each for being in 
an employee involvement team, receiving formal training in the past twelve 
months, and having high job security.7 We interacted this index with the 
shared capitalism index in regressions for the likelihood of searching for a 
new job, absenteeism, loyalty to the ﬁ  rm, willingness to work harder, and 
frequency of suggestions. In addition, we examined the interaction between 
shared capitalism and a measure of employer supervision of employees. Evi-
5. Research often ﬁ  nds an interaction between participation and ownership on output 
but most data sets contain little information on the mechanisms for this. The US Govern-
ment Accountability Oﬃce (GAO) study (1987), which matched survey data with records on 
company ﬁ  nances, found an interaction between employee participation in management and 
employee ownership on productivity, as did the US National Institute of Mental Health study 
(Rosen, Klein, and Young 1986) and its follow-  up study (Rosen and Quarry 1987). Freeman 
and Dube (chapter 5 of this volume) found that employee involvement had a larger impact 
on indicators of worker productivity, job satisfaction, and attitudes toward the ﬁ  rm than did 
participation in ﬁ  nancial rewards, but that the highest outcomes occurred when ﬁ  rms combined 
pay for company/  group performance, ownership stake in the ﬁ  rm, and employee involvement 
committees. Analyzing UK establishments, Conyon and Freeman (2001) found that the com-
panies that adopted proﬁ  t sharing, employee ownership, and broad stock option schemes had 
higher productivity and more information and decision sharing practices. Studies of ESOPs 
and other forms of employee ownership generally ﬁ  nd a positive relationship between owner-
ship and performance (Levine 1995, 81) that is strongest with worker participation.
6. Ichniowski et al. (1996); Ichniowski, Shaw, and Prennushi (1997); Huselid, Jackson, and 
Schuler (1997); Becker and Huselid (1998); and Becker, Huselid, and Ulrich (2001). Cappelli 
and Neumark found that high performance work practices such as self-  directed work teams 
only signiﬁ  cantly predicted increased productivity when combined with proﬁ  t/  gain sharing 
(2001, 34).
7. We experimented with indices that also included measures of information sharing, job 
rotation, and rigorous selection, and obtained similar results. We focus on the index based on 
employee involvement, training, and job security since the sample sizes are smaller for job rota-
tion and rigorous selection, and the grade of the company on sharing information reﬂ  ects an 
employee evaluation of the policy’s success rather than the existence of a policy.154    J.  R.  Blasi, R. B. Freeman, C. Mackin, and D. L. Kruse
dence presented in chapter 8 shows that workers covered by more shared 
capitalist policies are less closely supervised than others, suggesting that 
shared capitalism substitutes for supervision in motivating workers. Com-
bining shared capitalism with close supervision may reduce the eﬀect of 
shared capitalism by sending a mixed message to employees: “We want you 
to work harder and be more committed to the company because of your 
(proﬁ  t share/  employer stock/  stock options), but we’re still going to keep a 
very close eye on you.”
Finally, we also examine whether the extent to which shared capitalism 
substitutes for ﬁ  xed wages may also be an important determinant of its 
eﬀects. We expect that employees will react better to shared capitalist com-
pensation when it is a gift- exchange add- on to existing compensation, rather 
than a substitute for which they sacriﬁ  ce certain income ﬂ  ows for greater 
risk in compensation. While we do not have measures of alternative wages 
available to employees, the NBER survey asked how employees’ ﬁ  xed wages 
compare to market levels, from which we constructed a dummy variable 
indicating that the worker feels she or he is paid at or above market levels. We 
interact this variable with the shared capitalist index as well.
Table 4.3 summarizes the results of these calculations. The regression 
coeﬃcients on the interaction terms show that other ﬁ  rm policies mea-
sured by the high performance practice index aﬀects the impact of shared 
capitalism—representing possible complementarities on most outcome 
variables—and that supervision intensity and wage relative to market wage 
also have some interactive eﬀects. Column (1) shows that the positive eﬀect 
of shared capitalism on not searching for a new job exists only for those 
who are covered by the high performance policies and reveals a strong nega-
tive interaction of shared capitalism with close supervision. While column 
(2) ﬁ  nds no signiﬁ  cant interactions for any of the three new variables with 
the shared capitalism index in aﬀecting absenteeism, the high performance 
indicator reduces absences while close supervision raises them. With these 
variables and interactions the strong positive relation between shared capi-
talism and absenteeism is weakened and no longer signiﬁ  cantly diﬀerent 
from zero, suggesting that the eﬀect found in table 4.1 may be masking that 
of high performance, supervision, and pay relative to market. Columns (3) 
and (4) show substantial shared capitalism interactions on loyalty and will-
ingness to work hard. These outcomes are enhanced when shared capitalism 
is combined with high performance policies and ﬁ  xed pay at or above the 
market level, and are hurt when shared capitalism is combined with close 
supervision.
Finally, column (5) shows that shared capitalism has a negative inter-
action with high performance policies and a positive link to supervision 
in aﬀecting frequency of suggestions. The positive eﬀect of shared capi-
talist policies among workers who are not covered by high performance 
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already have the means and motivation to provide suggestions. One interpre-
tation of the positive interaction with supervision is that shared capitalism 
provides motivation to closely supervised workers to try to make changes 
in their work environment to relieve supervisory intensity. Whether these 
or other explanations account for the observed interactions, the important 
point is that the interactions are substantial, implying that analyses that 
treat shared capitalist compensation as a single innovation will invariably 
miss some of the ways in which it works and the conditions for it to work 
successfully.
As a graphic demonstration of the importance of the interactions, we 
show in ﬁ  gure 4.4 the relation between workers’ likelihood of looking to 
leave the ﬁ  rm with the shared capitalist index contingent on diﬀerent values 
of the interacting variables. Each line shows how the potential leaving vari-
able changes with shared capitalism given the speciﬁ  ed interaction. What 
is striking is the fanning out of the lines. Shared capitalism increases likely 
turnover when workers are very closely supervised and are not covered by 
any high performance policies (top line)—this may reﬂ  ect workers becoming 
cynical and wanting to leave when they learn that management espouses a 
shared capitalism philosophy but still treats them like ordinary employees. 
In contrast, shared capitalism decreases likely turnover when workers are 
covered by high performance policies, especially as supervision is lowered. 
The strongest eﬀects of shared capitalism are when it is combined with high 
performance policies and low levels of supervision, causing likely turnover 
to be cut from 12.0 percent to 6.6 percent as the shared capitalism index goes 
from 0 to 10 (bottom line of ﬁ  gure 4.4). The average results shown in table 
Fig.  4.4  Contingent  eﬀects of shared capitalism on likely turnoverCreating a Bigger Pie?    1 5 7
4.2 reﬂ  ect these diverse eﬀects, weighted by the proportion of workers in the 
various interactive categories.
Finally, we view the interactions shown in table 4.3 and ﬁ  gure 4.4 as sug-
gesting that the concept of “corporate culture” may provide a useful way 
to understand the relation between shared capitalism and the workplace 
outcomes. Analysts sometimes use the corporate culture term loosely with-
out any operational measurement/ deﬁ  nition that risks making it a catch- all 
phrase to describe residuals or puzzles. But when interaction or complemen-
tary eﬀects are demonstrably important, it seems natural to think that some 
underlying latent variable—corporate culture—may more usefully describe 
reality than analyses of separate interacting variables.
4.6    Worker  Views
As an alternative way to assess the impacts of shared capitalist incentives 
and of their interrelation with other aspects of corporate policy/ culture, we 
asked workers the following hypothetical question on the NBER survey:
To what extent would each of the following aﬀect your motivation to improve 
the business success of the company?8
You receive a cash incentive
The company grants you stock options
You receive some stock in the company ESOP
You can buy some company shares in the Employee Stock Purchase Plan 
(ESPP)
You buy some company shares in the open market
The upper panel of table 4.4 reports the responses to these questions. Close 
to three-  fourths of workers said that their motivation would be improved 
to a “great” or “very great” extent by receiving a cash incentive (78 percent) 
or stock options (77 percent), while about two-  thirds of workers said the 
same about receiving ESOP stock (69 percent) or buying shares through an 
ESPP (63 percent), and less than one-  third said this about buying company 
stock on the open market (30 percent). It is possible that this pattern reﬂ  ects 
employees’ analysis of risk, with the cash incentive and options and receiving 
stock in an ESOP being the least risky forms of compensation, and buying 
shares in the open market placing the workers’ capital at greatest risk. This 
pattern may also partly reﬂ  ect the immediacy of the reward, with cash incen-
tives and stock options providing the most immediate rewards. Alternatively, 
the lower responses for buying company stock through an ESPP or on the 
open market may reﬂ  ect lower enthusiasm for shared capitalism that the 
8. Employees were asked the stock options, ESOP, and ESPP questions only if the company 
provided these programs, and were asked the open market purchase questions only if they 
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worker must pay for, and is therefore not part of a “gift exchange” in which 
the employer provides shared capitalism on top of standard pay and beneﬁ  ts. 
It is noteworthy, however, that the small response to buying shares in the 
open market conﬂ  icts with the signiﬁ  cant impacts of that activity on some 
of the outcome variables in table 4.2.
To see whether worker responses to the hypothetical are inﬂ  uenced by 
other aspects of company policy/  practice, we estimated ordered probit re-
gressions using the variables found to have important interactions with the 
shared capitalism index in table 4.3. The results of these regressions, sum-
marized at the bottom of table 4.4, show positive eﬀects of the high perfor-
mance policy index in four of the ﬁ  ve questions (columns [2] through [5]), 
supporting the notion of a major complementarity between high perfor-
mance policies and shared capitalist compensation. Three of the regressions 
show positive eﬀects of having ﬁ  xed pay at or above market levels (columns 
[2], [4], and [5]), likewise supporting a complementarity, but only one regres-
sion shows a negative eﬀect of closer supervision (column [2]). The regres-
sion that shows a diﬀerent pattern from all others is the one assessing the 
eﬀects of receiving a cash incentive (column [1]). In this case, close supervi-
sion and perceiving one’s pay as below market raises its impact. The positive 
supervision interaction may be because workers believe that they are more 
likely to receive the incentive if their supervisor pays close attention to their 
eﬀort. The stronger eﬀect among those with below-  market pay may reﬂ  ect 
the view that cash incentives can help make up the perceived pay gap more 
quickly than by receiving company stock. Finally, we note that the ease of 
seeing how well co- workers work positively aﬀects each response, supporting 
the idea that an environment of worker co- monitoring is a component in the 
eﬀectiveness of shared capitalism plans.
4.7    Additional  Issues
Our analysis cannot rule out some potentially diﬀerent interpretations 
of the results. As discussed in the “Studying Shared Capitalism” section of 
the introduction to this volume, the ﬁ  ndings may reﬂ  ect the selectivity of 
workers into shared capitalist enterprises rather than or in addition to their 
response to the way those ﬁ  rms operate. Selectivity could aﬀect the analyses 
of workers in shared capitalist ﬁ  rms versus others in the GSS survey and 
would limit generalizing the NBER results to workers who do not work in 
such ﬁ  rms. Even within a ﬁ  rm, moreover, there may be something special 
about those who choose greater participation in shared capitalism—for 
instance, by buying stock through an ESPP or 401(k)—or who management 
places in positions with more shared capitalist incentives. To get some notion 
of the possible eﬀects of worker selectivity on our results, we examined the 
sensitivity of the results to two possible factors that might be associated 
with self- selection of workers into shared capitalism: a measure of self- rated 160    J.  R.  Blasi, R. B. Freeman, C. Mackin, and D. L. Kruse
risk aversion, and family wealth. Neither of these variables made noticeable 
changes in the relationship of the shared capitalism index either alone or 
with interactions to the outcomes in tables 4.2 and 4.3.
A second problem relates to the selectivity of ﬁ  rms into our NBER sample 
and the endogeneity of the decision to oﬀer shared capitalist compensation 
in both the NBER and GSS samples. Since our NBER results hold constant 
ﬁ  rm policies and characteristics by comparing workers with greater and 
lesser shared capitalism in the same ﬁ  rm, we doubt that they are seriously 
aﬀected by selectivity of ﬁ  rms, but there is the selectivity or endogeneity 
of the speciﬁ  c policies that the ﬁ  rms have chosen, which still makes causal 
interpretations of the type we have oﬀered open to criticism. In addition, 
because the NBER sample does not include ﬁ  rms with no shared capitalist 
arrangements and is based on ﬁ  rms’ willingness to participate, we cannot 
rule out serious selectivity problems along the ﬁ  rm dimension that might 
interact with other factors. As described in the “Studying Shared Capital-
ism” section of the introduction, we experimented with speciﬁ  cations to 
reduce endogeneity but had little luck in ﬁ  nding suitable exogenous variables 
that would predict the endogenous variables but not directly aﬀect the out-
come variables of interest.
Even substantial selectivity among workers or ﬁ  rms, however, does not 
gainsay the importance of shared capitalist compensation, for it is presum-
ably the interaction between shared capitalist incentives and mode of oper-
ating and worker characteristics that underlies the selectivity of workers, 
and the interaction between other ﬁ  rm policies and their choice of shared 
capitalist compensation that underlies the selectivity of ﬁ  rms. What selectiv-
ity does is weaken our ability to infer what might happen if additional ﬁ  rms 
adopted shared capitalist arrangements from the successes of existing ﬁ  rms 
with those practices.
4.8    Conclusion
The principal ﬁ  nding of this chapter is that shared capitalism aﬀects 
workplace performance. The robustness of the ﬁ  nding is increased by the 
fact that the results from the NBER sample are broadly similar to the results 
from the nationally- representative GSS. Shared capitalism is linked to lower 
turnover and greater loyalty and willingness to work hard, particularly when 
combined with high-  performance policies, low levels of supervision, and 
ﬁ  xed pay at or above market levels. Workplaces where workers average more 
shared capitalist compensation report greater employee eﬀort along several 
dimensions. The only outcome with which shared capitalist compensation 
is adversely related is absenteeism, but this result largely disappears when 
controlling for interactions with high performance policies and closeness 
of supervision.
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are for proﬁ  t sharing and employee ownership. The largely positive results 
are corroborated by worker views: most workers report that cash incentives, 
stock options, ESOP stock, and ESPP participation motivate them to work 
harder. The less risky forms of shared capitalist programs—proﬁ  t shar-
ing, gain sharing, stock options, and ESOPs—have greater eﬀects than the 
riskier programs in line with concerns about workers being averse to risking 
their own capital. (For a closer look at the role of objective and subjective 
risk in shared capitalism programs, see chapter 3.)
Finally, we ﬁ  nd important interactions between shared capitalist pro-
grams and other aspects of company policies that aﬀect workplace perfor-
mance. High performance policies are positively linked to good workplace 
outcomes, and are driven by certain types of shared capitalism. This evi-
dence, combined with chapter 2 (which ﬁ  nds that shared capitalism increases 
worker monitoring), challenges the critique that the motivations of the 
average worker interfere with the introduction of basic shared capitalism 
principles. The interaction of the eﬀects of shared capitalism with other 
corporate policies suggests that the various shared capitalist and other poli-
cies may operate through a latent variable, “corporate culture.” Practically 
speaking, the most important implication of this chapter is that shared capi-
talism and high performance policies appear to work together, with greater 
impacts when they are combined than when they are used separately.162    J.  R.  Blasi, R. B. Freeman, C. Mackin, and D. L. Kruse
Appendix
Table 4A.1  Prevalence of shared capitalism programs






data set  
Sample sizes
GSS   NBER
Bonus eligibility
  Proﬁ  t sharing 35.9%   71.3% 2,386 41,018
  Gain  sharing 24.9%  20.7% 2,386 41,023
    Size of most recent bonus, if eligible for any
    Mean  dollar  value $6,265 $11,329 693 26,113
    Median  dollar  value $1,500 $2,000 693 26,113
    Mean  %  of  pay  8.9%  12.1% 645 22,019
    Median  %  of  pay  4.6%   5.7% 645 22,019
Employee ownership
    Own employer stock in any form 19.4%   64.0% 2,406 41,206
    Own employer stock through:
    Employee  Stock  Ownership  Plan   8.1% 41,109
    Employee  Stock  Purchase  Plan  17.6% 40,990
    401(k)  plan  33.5% 40,885
    Exercising  options  and  keeping  stock   5.0% 41,032
    Open  market  purchase   7.3% 41,145
    Value of employer stock, if own stock
    Dollar  value:  Mean $63,130 $60,078 318 25,447
    Dollar  value:  Median $10,000 $14,375 318 25,447
    %  of  pay:  Mean 81.7%  65.0% 302 22,715
    %  of  pay:  Median 23.0%  30.6% 302 22,715
    %  of  wealth:  Mean  19.6% 23,141
    %  of  wealth:  Median  10.0% 23,141
Stock options
    Currently hold stock options 11.3%   21.9% 2,392 41,166
    Ever granted stock options   22.3% 41,166
    Granted stock options last year   20.4% 41,158
    Value of stock options, if hold options:
        Mean dollar value of unvested options $112,882 8,390
        Mean dollar value of vested options $143,117 8,497
    Total  dollar  value:  Mean $249,901 8,656
    Total  dollar  value:  Median $75,000 8,656
    %  of  pay:  Mean 183.7% 8,403
    %  of  pay:  Median 100.0% 8,403
    %  of  wealth:  Mean  60.3% 8,104
    %  of  wealth:  Median  28.6% 8,104
Any of above programs   44.9%    85.7%   2,430   41,206
Source: Tabulated from GSS and NBER surveys. The GSS sample is limited to private for- 
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